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Part IV
Cooperatives and the Antitrust Laws
The foremost legal hazard to the organization and operation of
agricultural cooperatives has been the common law and statutory pro-
hibitions against monopolies and restraints of trade. Following many
adverse decisions during the 1890's and in the early part of the twentieth
century, the courts and legislatures have generally accepted the mere
formation of agricultural cooperatives as lawful. Consequently, anti-
trust proceedings have been sporadic and usually unsuccessful since
World War I. Nevertheless, the state and, more importantly, the federal
antitrust laws continue as a potential check on the activities of both
purchasing and marketing cooperatives. The extent and effectiveness
of their application to cooperatives necessarily requires consideration in
an appraisal of agricultural cooperation.1
The position of cooperatives in our economy is intimately connected
with the difficulties posed by the long-term existence of surplus farm
production. Shrinkage of the foreign market, a tremendous increase in
output per unit 6f land due to mechanization and technological advances,
changes in food consumption habits, and a decrease in the rate of growth
of the United States' population have combined to make farm surpluses
a recurrent problem, especially since the first World War.2  Individual
farmers, lacking adequate storage facilities and dependent upon a rapid
turnover of harvested crops to meet operating expenses, occupy an ex-
tremely disadvantageous bargaining position in disposing of over-
abundant production to much larger, highly concentrated purchasers. 3
The consequent depression of farm prices, such as occurred during the
1920's, drastically reduces farmer income. In turn, decreased purchasing
1. Although the present discussion will consider only the limitations placed upon
cooperative activities by the antitrust laws, it should be noted that cooperatives are
frequently an effective means of fostering the over-all purpose of" the antitrust laws,
the checking of monopoly power. One of the most important factors in the rapid growth
of agriculture cooperatives has been the desire to avoid the depressed prices resulting
from markets controlled by one or a limited number of buyers. See BLANKERTZ, MARKET-
ING COOPERATIVES 16 (1940) ; NOURSE, TiE LEGAL STATUS oF AGRICULTURAL COOPERA-
TION 12 (1927).
2. DE"T OF AGRIC., AcHIEVING A BALANcED AGRICULTURE 6-17 (1934); EzEcIEL
AND BEAN, ECONOmIC BASES FOR THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT AcT 32-39 (Dep't of
Agric. 1933) ; SciHOFF, A NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY c. 3 (1950).
3. EZEKIEL AND BEAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 40; HERMANN AND WELDEN, DisTRI-
BUTION OF MILK BY FARMERS' COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATIONS 1 (F.C.A. CIRC. No. C-124,
1941); Note, 23 NOTRE DAME LAW. 110, 114 (1947).
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power at the farm level is an important factor in disruptions of the entire
economic system.4
The importance of agricultural prosperity both to the farmers and
to the national economy has contributed to extensive private and govern-
mental efforts to ameliorate the surplus and other farm problems. Armong
the earliest methods employed by farmers was collective action through
marketing cooperatives. Elimination of middlemen, establishment of
storage space, and cumulation of the bargaining power of individual
members into a united front served to reduce the farmer's economic
disadvantage.5 Government action was initially limited to encourage-
ment of cooperative associations. However, following the severe dis-
locations of the Great Depression, Government measures dealing directly
with the surplus problem have multiplied.6 The relation of cooperatives
to the antitrust laws may well be influenced by future developments in
the control of surpluses and the respective roles of Government and
cooperatives therein.
STATE ANTITRUST LAWS
Marketing associations endeavor to assure control over a portion
of the available supply of the commodity handled, sufficient to create
effective bargaining power, by requiring that the member's full produc-
tion be marketed through cooperative channels.7  However, at one time,
some state courts refused to enforce these full production agreements
as contravening common law, statutory, or constitutional proscriptions
against restraint of trade and monopolies.8
4. EZEKIEL AND BEAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 8; SCHOFF, op. cit. supra note 2,
c. 5. See, generally, MEANS, INDUSTRIAL PRICES AND THEm RELATIVE INFLEXIBILITY,
Sm. Doc. No. 13, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935).
5. NouRsE, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 7; Note, 23 NoTRE DAME LAW. 110 (1947). The
failure of cooperatives to achieve significant success in improving farm conditions during
the crisis years of the 1920's is noted in DE'T oF AGRIc., AcHIEVING A BALANCED) AaRI-
CULTURE 16 (1934) ; EzEmEL AND BEAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 40-44.
6. For some descriptions of the farm program of the Federal Government and pro-
posals for future action, see DEp'T OF AGic., ACHIEVING A BALANCED AGRIcuLTURE
(1934) ; EZEI L AND BEAN, op. cit. supra note 2; BLAISDELL, GOVERNMENT AND AGRI-
CULTURE c. III (1940) ; MCCUNE, THE FAM BLOC c. 2 (1943) ; ScHooF, op cit. supra
note 2; SCHULTZ, REDIRECTING FARM POLICY (1943) ; WALLACE, AMERICA MUST CHOOSE
(World Affairs pamphlet No. 3, 1934); Shields and Shulman, Federal Price Support
for Agricultural Comzodities, 34 IowA L. REv. 188 (1949).
7. See PART III, pp. 404-405, supra.
8. Georgia Fruit Exchange v. Turnipseed, 9 Ala. App. 123, 62 So. 542 (1913);
Burns v. Wray Farmers' Grain Co., 65 Colo. 425, 176 Pac. 487 (1918); Atchinson v.
Colorado Wheat Growers' Ass'n, 77 Colo. 559, 238 Pac. 1117 (1925); Ford v. Chicago
Milk Shippers' Ass'n, 155"111. 166, 39 N.E. 651 (1895); Ludewese v. Farmers' Mutual
Co-Operative Co., 164 Iowa 197, 145 N.W. 475 (1914); Reeves V. Decorah Farmers'
Co-Operative Society, 160 Iowa 194, 140 N.W. 844 (1913). Contra: Ex parte Baldwin
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Statutory exemptions of cooperatives from the state antitrust laws
were thwarted temporarily by the United States Supreme Court in
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.9 Exception of agricultural coopera-
tives was considered an unreasonable classification violating the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the states
continued to enact exclusionary legislation, and the Connolly case was
soon distinguished'0  and eventually overruled." Presently, all states
have cooperative marketing statutes/2 which usually authorize formation
of marketing cooperatives and the execution of entire output contracts
with members. 18  Under such succoring legislation, the intrastate activi-
ties of agricultural cooperatives have almost uniformly prevailed against
attacks based on state antitrust laws.'-
The trend of the statutes and decisions reflects a strong public
policy favorable to agricultural cooperation. Supporting propositions
are that cooperatives benefit the entire public by alleviating the depressed
status of agriculture -while merely affording farmers protection from un-
fair prices offered by organized purchasers. And, further, monopoliza-
tion is impossible or has not occurred. 15  Hence, any restraints on com-
petition ire reasonable within the common law "rule of reason" or
similar statutory exceptions. However, there are occasional intimations
Co. Producers Corp., 203 Ala. 345, 83 So. 69 (1919) ; Burley Tobacco Society v. Gillaspy,
51 Ind. App. 583, 100 N.E. 89 (1912) ; Commonwealth v. Hodges, 137 Ky. 233, 125 S.W.
689 (1910) (statute) ; Owen County Burley Tobacco Society v. Brumback, 128 Ky. 137,
107 S.W. 710 (1908) (statute) ; Castorland Milk and Cheese Co. v. Shantz, 179 N.Y.
Supp. 13 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Phez Co. v. Salem Fruit Union, 103 Or. 514, 201 Pac. 222
(1921). For discussions of these and other similar cases, see HULBERT, LEGAl. PHASES
OF COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATIONS 199 (F.C.A. BULL. No. 50, 1942); NOURSE, op. cit. supra
note 1, c. 14; Hanna, Cooperative Associations and the. Public, 29 MICH. L. REv. 148,
159 (1930) ; Tobriner, Cooperative Marketing and the Restraint of Trade, 27 Cor. L. REV.
827 (1927); Note, 27 VA. L. REv. 674 (1941).
9. 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
10. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-Operative Marketing
Ass'n 276 U.S. 71 (1928) ; International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199 (1914).
11. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
12. Collected in Jensen, The Bill of Rights of U.S. Cooperative Agriculture, 20
ROCKY MT. L. REv. 181, 191 n.29 (1948). The prototype of the majority of these
statutes is the Bingham Act, first enacted by Kentucky in 1922. Ky. REv. STAT. C. 272
(1946).
13. NouRsE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 107; Note, 22 NoTE DAME LAW. 414 (1947).
14. E.g., Warren v. Alabama Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n, 213 Ala. 61, 104 So. 264
(1925) ; Rifle Potato Growers Ass'n v. Smith, 78 Colo. 171, 240 Pac. 937 (1925) ; Clear
Lake Cooperative Ass'n v. Wier, 200 Iowa 1293, 206 N.W. 297 (1925); Dark Tobacco
Growers' Cooperative Ass'n v. Robertson, 84 Ind. App. 51, 150 N.E. 106 (1926); To-
bacco Growers' Co-operative Ass'n v. Jones, 185 N.C. 265, 117 S.E. 174 (1923); List
v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-Operative Ass'n, 114 Ohio St. 361, 151 N.E. 471 (1926) ;
Northern Wisconsin Cooperative Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571, 197 N.W. 936
(1924). See NOURSE, op. cit. .supra note 1, c. 15; Note, 27 VA. L. REv. 674, 676 (1941).
15. See Arndt, The Law of California Co-Operative Marketing Associations, 8
CALIF. L. REV. 281, 284 (1920) ; Hanna, supra note 8, at 165; Tobriner, supra note 8;
Note, 27 VA. L. REv. 674, 676 (1941).
NOTES
that, even under state permissive legislation, cooperative restraints are
lawful only when "reasonable ';"16 that cooperatives may not restrict
production or enhance prices beyond their "true value". 17 Yet, coopera-
tive restrictions on production, although a relatively common practice,' 8
have escaped judicial condemnation by the state courts within recent
years. And, of course, the "true value" of a product, at least in monetary
terms, would not seem to be capable of determination.'-
At the most, reservations as to "reasonableness" signify that the
cooperatives may not engage in flagrantly predatory activities. In view
of the general ineffectiveness of the state antitrust laws' 9 and the present
favorable attitude of the judiciary and legislatures, this should not prove
to be a very stringent restriction. Illustrative of the present liberal
approach is a recent Ohio case, Superior Dairy, Inc. v. Stark County
Milk Producers' Ass'n.2 0  The dairy sought a declaratory judgment that
the defendant cooperative, comprising over 90%o of the milk producers
in the area, violated the state antitrust laws in refusing to sell milk to
the plaintiff-distributor unless the plaintiff discontinued a discount sys-
tem which it had established. A further allegation was that the co-
operative intended to fix prices charged milk consumers in the area and
to prevent competition in the sale of milk. A demurrer to the complaint
was sustained on the ground that the Ohio Cooperative Agricultural
Marketing Act,2 ' broadly construed in the light of public policy, ex-
empted the defendant's alleged activities from the state antitrust laws.
The Superior Dairy case indicates that marketing cooperatives may
enforce retail price maintenance by refusals to sell. 22  Under state fair
trade acts, consumer cooperatives may be required to maintain minimum
retail prices.23  These acts are normally applicable to cooperatives, and
16. E.g., Denton v. Alabama Cotton Co-Operative Ass'n, 30 Ala. App. 429, 7 So.2d
504 (1942) ; Starke County Milk Producers' Ass'n v. Tabeling, 129 Ohio 159, 194 N.E.
16 (1933).
17. See Tobacco Growers' Co-Operative Ass'n v. Jones, 185 N.C. 265, 280, 117 S.E.
174, 181 (1923) ; List v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-Operative Ass'n, 114 Ohio St. 361,
151 N.E. 471, 476 (1926); Washington Cranberry Growers Ass'n v. Moore, 117 Wash.
430, 438, 201 Pac. 773, 776 (1921). See Keegan, Power of Agricultural Co-Operative
Associations to Limit Production, 26 MIcir. L. REv. 648 (1928).
18. Tobriner, supra note 8, at 835.
19. Comment, 43 ILL. L. REv. 205, 220 (1948); Legis., 32 CoL. L. REv. 347, 364
(1932).
20. 89 Ohio App. 26, 100 N.E.2d 695 (1950).
21. OHio GEN. CODE Ann. § 10186-1 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1951).
22. But Cf. Hy-Grade Dairies v. Falls City Milk Producers Ass'n, 261 Ky. 25, 86
S.W. 2d 1046 (1935). Compare United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), with
F.T.C. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922). See Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121
(1948), for a general commentary on the legality of refusals to sell.
23. Bunn, Consuners Co-Operatives and Price Fixing Laws, 40 MIcH. L. REv. 165,
171 (1941). See, on the fair trade laws generally, McLaughlin, Fair Trade Acts, 86
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a special exemption by a Wisconsin statute was declared unconstitutional
by the state court. 24  However, patronage refunds should not be con-
demned under the fair trade laws since refunds neither constitute price
cutting on any particular item nor threaten the reputation of any
product. 2 5
The practices of cooperatives are in certain instances closely regu-
lated by state control measures, particularly in the milk industry.26 When
a cooperative is operating under a valid state marketing order, or other
regulatory procedures, the state antitrust laws are inapplicable. And if
the state order does not conflict with the operation of the Federal Agri-
cultural Marketing Act,2 7 or is not otherwise invalid, cooperatives act-
ing in conformity with such order would not be subject to the federal
antitrust laws, which do not encompass state action.28
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
The Sherman Antitrust Act 29 has been in effect for approximately
60 years, yet its 'application to agricultural cooperatives remains un-
certain. There is considerable doubt that the Act was originally in-
tended to apply to other than corporations and trusts engaging in inter-
state commerce. 80  However, an early construction included labor un-
ions,31 and cooperatives apparently would also be brought within the
ambit of the Act. Apprehensive that the mere formation of a coopera-
tive would be considered a combination and conspiracy in restraint of
U. OF PA. L. REv. 803 (1938); Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and the Law of Restric-
tive Covenants, 49 YALE L.J. 607 (1940); Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 381 (1952).
24. Weco Products Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N.W. 426 (1937).
25. Bunn, supra note 23, at 173. In accord are those cases holding that giving, with
each sale, trade receipt coupons which can be used later on the purchase price of any
item is permissible under the fair trade acts. Food & Grocery Bureau v. Garfield, 20 Cal.
2d 228, 125 P.2d 3 (1942) ; Weco Products v. lMid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal.
App.2d 684, 131 P.2d 856 (1943); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6
A.2d 843 (1939). Contra: Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177
(1950). Compare Sperry & Hutchison Co. v. McBride, 307 Mass. 408, 30 N.E.2d 269
(1940), with Ed. Schuster & Co. v. Steffes, 237 Wis. 41, 295 N.W. 737 (1941).
26. Cadwallader, Government and Its Relationship to Price Standards in the Milk
Industry, 22 MINN. L. REV. 789, 809 (1938).
27. See note 67 infra and accompanying text.
28. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1942). Of course, a state may not insulate
cooperative activity from the federal antitrust laws simply by means of permissive legis-
lation. The state itself must provide the machinery of control to come within the
Parker v. Brown decision. Id. at 351.
29. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1946).
30. Schmidt, The Application of the. Antitrust Laws to Labor: A New Era, 19
TEx. L. REv. 256 (1941) surveys the controversy over the intended scope of the Sherman
Act, with particular reference to labor unions.
31. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) ; Schmidt, supra note 30.
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trade, as some state courts had already held,32 cooperative associations
pressed for legislative exemnptions.
These efforts culminated in the Clayton Act,33 enacted in 1914, and
the passage of the Capper-Volstead Act8 4 in 1922. Section 6 of the
Clayton Act provides that the federal antitrust laws are not to forbid
the existence or operation of non-stock, non-profit labor, agricultural, or
horticultural organizations, and are not to restrain the lawful effectua-
tion of their legitimate objects; nor are such organizations to be con-
sidered illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade.3 5  The
Capper-Volstead Act authorizes the organization of marketing coopera-
tives on a capital stock basis, and sanctions common marketing agencies
and execution of necessary contracts and agreements.3 6
Uncertainty as to the precise scope of the exemption afforded co-
operatives by the Clayton and Capper-Volstead Acts was partially re-
solved by United States v. Borden Co.,3 7 the only. relevant Supreme
Court decision. A criminal action was instituted charging a combina-
tion and conspiracy among a milk cooperative and its officials, milk
distributors, a labor union, and city officials to fix prices and control
production in the Chicago fluid milk market. Reversing the conclusion
of the lower court that agriculture cooperatives were absolutely exempt
from the antitrust laws, the Supreme Court held that such an organiza-
tion could violate the Sherman Act by combining and conspiring with
others.
However, there is still no authoritative answer to the question
whether a cooperative association acting alone or in concert with other
cooperatives is entirely without the provisions of the Sherman Act.
The Borden case is not decisive on this proposition. The opinion was
expressly limited to the situation where the cooperative conspires with
others. In the somewhat analogous area of the application of the Sher-
man Act to labor unions, a union is not subject to the Act when it
proceeds independently,33 even though conspiracy with non-union parties
32. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
33. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1946).
34. 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §§291-292 (1946).
35. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1946).
36. 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. 5291 (1946). The Act requires qualifying asso-
ciations to conform to traditional cooperative principles. The association must be oper-
ated for the mutual benefit of members, and either each member must be given one vote
or dividends on stock and membership capital must be limited to 8 per cent yearly. In
addition, the cooperatives may not deal with the products of nonmembers to a greater
extent than with the products of members.
37. 308 U.S. 188 (1939). For a popular account of the background of this case,
see Milk in Chicago, Fortune Magazine 80 (Nov. 1939).
38. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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is actionable. 39  Thus, in United States v. Dairy Cooperative Ass'n,40
a Federal District Court refused "to scuttle the plain language of the
Clayton Act, as antilabor courts scuttled the labor provisions of the
same act," and held that monopolistic conduct by a cooperative was not
illegal when other parties were not involved. Some support for this
position can be found in the legislativ'e history of the Clayton and
Capper-Volstead Acts,4 ' although there are equally persuasive state-
ments to the contrary. 42
A more powerful argument for a broad construction of the coopera-
tive exemption is the divergence between government policy towards
competition in agriculture as compared with the policy to encourage and
protect competition contemplated by the antitrust laws. The maintenance
of effective competition, the nexus of antitrust policy,43 is not the
principal consideration in the present governmental approach to agricul-
tural problems. Rather, the emphasis increasingly has been to control
and channelize competition among producers of agricultural commodi-
ties. The government has permitted, or actually enforced, limitations on
production and has controlled prices of certain farm products under the
Agricultural Marketing Act.4" And it has sought to establish floors
under the prices received by farmers by means of the parity formula.4 5
From this, it might be persuasively contended that the Clayton and
Capper-Volstead provisions were merely the first step of a government
program to lessen rather than promote competition among agricultural
producers and to procure higher prices for farmers rather than lower
prices, for consumers; consequently, the antitrust exemptions should be
broadly construed to prevent the agricultural program from being crip-
pled by the conflicting purposes of the antitrust laws.
39. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, I.B.E.W., 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
40. 49 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1943). See Farmers Cooperative Co. v. Birmingham.
86 F. Supp. 201, 229 (N.D. Iowa 1949); United States v. Elm Spring Farm, 38 F. Supp.
508, 511 (D. Mass. 1941). See Jensen, supra note 12, at 189.
41. E.g., Speech of Senator Kellog, 62 CONG. REc. 2049 (1922) ; Speech of Senator
Fletcher, 62 CONG. REc. 2107 (1922). See Kovner, The Legislative. History of Section 6
of the Clayton Act, 47 COL. L. REv. 749 (1947).
42. E.g., Speech of Representative Volstead, 61 CONG. REc. 1033 (1921). See Hanna,
Antitrust Inznninities of Cooperative Asso'ciations, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 488, 493
(1948).
43. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 490-500 (1939).
44. See note 67 infra and accompanying text.
45. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 31 (1938), as amended, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1282 et seq. (Supp. 1951). This statute also provides for the governmental promulga-
tion of marketing quotas for certain crops, including tobacco, wheat, and cotton. For
further information on governmental farm legislation and policies, see BLAISDELL, op.
cit. supra note 6, especially c. III; DEERING, USDA MANAGER OF AmERicAN AGIUcuLTuRE
(1945); LARSON. AGRIcULTURAL MARKETING c. 24 (1951); Shields and Shulman, supra
note 6.
NOTES
Nevertheless, an equally convincing argument can be advanced that
cooperatives, acting alone, are not totally excluded from the operation
of the Sherman Act. Section 6 of the Clayton Act appears to be pri-
marily concerned with removing the threat that the mere existence of a
cooperative would be an illegal restraint of competition, and speaks of
"la.wfully carrying out the legitimate -objects thereof." Relying upon
this emphasis on legality, the Court soon construed Section 6 to leave
labor unions, as organizations, subject to all the prohibitions of the
Sherman Act.46  Later decisions virtually removing unions from the
restrictions of the Act were predicated on an interaction of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act47 with the Clayton Act Section 6.48 Of course, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act is not concerned with agricultural, cooperatives.
The Capper-Volstead Act merely extended the privilege of organizing
cooperatives free from the restraints of the antitrust laws to those hav-
ing capital stock and paying dividends and does not expressly purport to
give a complete immunity.
Although governmental farm policy has frequently fostered con-
trolled prices and production of some agricultural products, this control
has been under the direction or supervision of government agencies.
As such, it affords little justification for allowing private groups, respon-
sible to no one except their own members, to exercise such powers with
impunity. There would seem to be a considerable public interest in the
maintenance of an abundant supply of food, and other vital farm com-
modities, at reasonable prices. Some public- restraint should be main-
tained over private groups controlling, or having the potentiality to
control, this fundamental segment of our economy.
Should a narrow construction of the cooperative exemption be ac-
cepted, farmers would be placed nearly on a par with corporations under
the antitrust laws. Association of farmers into cooperative groups for
joint action would not be per se illegal. Thus, farmers could mitigate
the handicap of competing among themselves in a situation of almost
perfect competition while buying and selling in markets often under
monopoly, oligopoly, or lesser degrees of control. Yet, cooperative
46. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). See GREGORY,
LABoR A D THE LAw c. 8-9 (Rev. ed. 1949). United States v. King, 229 Fed. 275 (D.
Mass. 1915), 250 Fed. 908 (D. Mass. 1916), the only important federal case arising
between the enactment of the Clayton and Capper-Volstead Acts, held that a potato
cooperative which blacklisted and boycotted certain nonmembers engaged in an illegal
restraint of trade under the Sherman Act. The cooperative was not exempted by the
Clayton Act Section 6 since these activities were not "lawful."
47. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1946).
48. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). See Gregory, The New
Shernzan-Clayton-N~orris-LaGardia Act, 8 U. OF CHr. L. REv. 503 (1941); Schmidt,
supra note 30, at 287,
437
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groups, as entities, could not combine or conspire with others in restraint
of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, nor could they
legally acquire monopoly control over the market, alone or in combina-
tion with others, in violation of Section 2 of the Act.
49
Collective action between two or more cooperatives could constitute
a "combination or conspiracy with others" within the meaning of the
Borden case, and thus be non-exempt if in restraint of trade. However,
federated cooperatives are so tightly interwoven and centrally controlled
that they are in fact, as well as theory, one large cooperative. ° Hence,
they should come within the exemptions which the law affords individual
cooperatives, and not be considered a loose combination of their respec-
tive units. The Capper-Volstead Act expressly legalizes common mar-
keting agents for cooperative associations coming under the Act.5 ' In
addition, the Cooperative Marketing Act authorizes the acquisition, in-
terpretation, and exchange of past, present, and future crop and market
statistics among associations and federations of marketing cooperatives. 2
These provisions seemingly neutralize those cases finding trade associa-
tions to be in violation of the Sherman or Federal Trade Commission
Acts to the extent that such cases were based on the exchange of detailed
pricing and production information and the consequent pressure to con-
form, inherent in the exchange.. 3 But, more concrete efforts to assure
adherence to uniform prices would not necessarily be legalized.
49. Some excellent articles on the present status of the antitrust laws and the
policies influencing their application are: Adelman, Integration and Anti-trust Policy,
61 HARv. L. REv. 27 (1949) ; Chadwell and McLaren, The Current Status of the Anti-
trust Laws, (1950) U. OF ILL. L. FoRum 491; Fuchs, Economic Considerations in the
Enforcemtt of the Antitrust Laws of the United States, 34 MINN. L. R-v. 210 (1950);
Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 153 (1947); Peppin,
Price-Fixing Agreements under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 667
(1940) ; Rostow, Moiwpoly under the Shervm Act: Power or Purpose, 43 ILZ. L. Rxv.
745 (1949) ; Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14
U. OF CHI. L. REV. 567 (1947); Wood, The Supreme Court and a Changing Antitrust
Concept, 97 U. OF PA. L. REV. 309 (1949).
50. See PART I, p. 364, infra.
51. 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §291 (1946).
52. 44 STAT. 803 (1926), 7 U.S.C. §455 (1946).
53. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; The Sugar In-
stitute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371
(1923) ; American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). See
also, Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Maple Flooring
Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) ; Tag Manufacturers Insti-
tute v. F.T.C., 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949). The activities of trade associations in
assembling and distributing market statistics were important factors in these cases only
when the information enabled the association members to fix prices or to engage in
imperfect competition by making it' possible for each member to discern what his
competitors were doing, and the probable effect of his actions upon competitors and
upon the market. The particularity of pricing and production information, whether
NOTES
Even should the cooperative exemption be strictly construed, the
control of the market necessary to constitute illegal monopolization is
uncertain. The Alcoa case 4 found that 90% control of aluminum ingot
production was monopolistic and there were dicta that two-thirds con-
trol would probably be. sufficient; at least where there was a general
intent to monopolize. 55 Accepting the rationale of the Alcoa opinion,
that a monopoly is illegal per se because it has the power to control
prices, which is illegal per se, an organization that acquires and exercises
power to substantially affect or fix prices in the narket monopolizes in
violation of Section 2.5 6  Where there is a specific intent to monopolize,
control over a much smaller percentage of the market may comprise an
illegal attempt to monopolize. 57 Furthermore, the illegal monopoly or
restraint may be of an identifiable local market. 
58
Monopoly control over a market by a cooperative is improbable,
whatever the lower limits of monopolization may prove to be, where a
crop or livestock is grown over a large area and marketed nationally.
The large number of individual farmers involved, together with the rela-
tive ease of entry and egress from the market, would make effective
control over a considerable period of time nearly impossible.59 However,
cooperatives have and do exercise up to 100%o control over the produc-
tion and sale of certain commodities, which are either grown in a
limited, contiguous geographic area, such as cranberries and citrus fruit,
or have primarily a localized market, as the fluid milk market. 60
knowledge of past practices or future plans was disseminated, the availability of the
statistics to outsiders, and the pressure, both moral and legal, brought on members to
refrain from price-cutting are relevant factors having varying weight in the decision of
the cases. See, generally, Donovan, Trade Association Administratimi and Protection
under the Antitrust and Other Laws, 30 GEo. UJ. 17, 149 (1941); Hale, Agreements
Among Competitors: Incidental and Reasonable Restraints of Trade, 33 MINN. L. Ray.
331 (1949).
54. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
55. Id. at 424. The court also stated that control of one-third of the market would
definitely not be monopolistic. This dictum has been criticized as "unrealistic." Fuchs,
supra note 49, at 217. See Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32
COL. L. Ray. 179 (1932), for a description of difficulties encountered in the earlier cases
in determining the percentage of market control necessary for a Section 2 violation.
56. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
See Levi, supra note 49, at 175.
57. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), 338 U.S. 338 (1949);
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
58. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 72 S.Ct. 181 (1951); Indiana Farmer's
Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934).
59. NotnRSE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 428; Tobriner, supra note 8, at 828; SEN. REP.
No. 236, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1921).
60. SEN. REP. No. 236, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1921). The percentage of coopera-
tive control in any particular product or area is subject to considerable variation from
year to year, depending upon membership, productivity of members as compared with
nonmembers, and oth.er variables. Moreover, there is often intensive inter-product compe-
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If the number of cases is any criterion, the most pressing antitrust
problems involving agricultural cooperatives arise from the marketing
of fluid milk. The seasonal fluctuations of supply, without commensu-
rate variations in demand, the perishable quality of the product, and
the geographically limited market create potentially ruinous competitive
situations.6 ' Such conditions are highly conducive .to cooperation, inte-
gration, and other practices designed to limit competition and maintain
profitable prices, and have contributed to almost nation-wide adoption of
classified price plans for the sale of fluid milk from producers to handlers.
Essentially, the classified price plan achieves an artificial differentia-
tion in milk prices dependent upon use. A substantially higher price is
paid for Class I milk, that marketed as fluid milk to ultimate consumers,
than for Class II milk, which is processed into manufactured dairy
products. 62  The milk producers receive a "blend" price based upon an
average of fluid and manufactured milk sales over a specified period,
irrespective of the actual utilization of their particular shipments of milk.
The maintenance of this rigid price differential requires a high
degree of cooperation by producers, handlers, and distributors, or
alternatively monopoly control at one stage of the marketing process.
tition among farm commodities -and competition from foreign sources is frequently a
potent factor.
No available single source for complete statistics on the control exercised by cooper-
atives over the various agricultural commodities is known. The following figures, while
approximations, are thought to be somewhat representative. They are illustrative only
and are not intended to be inclusive of all instances of considerable market control; nor
is it suggested that a monopoly necessarily exists. Unless otherwise indicated, statistics
are taken or computed from the Annual Report or other publication of the organization.
California Walnut Growers Ass'n-8555 of shipments of in-shell walnuts during 1950.
American Cranberry Exchange-53% of" 1950 cranberry crop. Maine Potato Growers,
Inc.-26.5% of 1948-49 shipments of seed potatoes. California Fruit Growers Exchange
-74% of California-Arizona citrus fruit (43.4% of total U.S. production) (reported in
GARDNER AND McKAY, THE CALIFORNIA FRUIT GROwERS ExCHANGE SYSTEM 7, 14 [F.
C.A. CIRc. No. C-135, 1950]). California Almond Growers Ass'n-70% of 1946-47 crop
(reported in 15 News for Farmer Cooperatives 12 [Aug. 1948]). FTC, REPORT ON THE
SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF MILK PRODUCTS (1935-37) contains the findings by the
Federal Trade Commission investigation of several large milk marketing areas. The
percentage of milk production controlled by a single cooperative ranged up to the 85%
supplied Minneapolis and St. Paul by the Twin City Producers Ass'n. See Cadwallader,
supra note 26, at 818-821.
Monopoly control by purchasing cooperatives is also possible, especially when they
have manufacturing facilities. However, as yet they do a relatively small amount of
business when compared with similar non-cooperative enterprises. See Part I, pp. 356-358,
infra. Pugchasing associations do not come within the provision of the Capper-Volstead
Act, which suggests that the antitrust laws may be. more broadly applicable to such
cooperatives.
61. Cadwallader, supra note 26; Havina, Cooperative Milk Marketing and Restraint
of Trade, 23 Ky. L.J. 217, 235 (1,935).
62. Under some plans, there are three classes rather than two. See the articles
cited in note 61 supra for a more detailed exposition of the operation of these plans.
Also, see Let 'ein Drink Grade "A", Fortune Magazine 83. (Nov. 1939).
NOTES
The role of cooperatives varies from market to market. They may func-
tion only as a bargaining agency for their member producers, or in
addition perform milk collection duties. Some cooperatives extend their
functions to wholesale or retail distribution or both and provide fa-
cilities for manufacture of surplus milk.13 Occasionally, they are the
overall policing agency for the market. Since the cooperatives would
ordinarily be forced to collaborate with other parties,'there is little doubt
that their activities fall within the coverage of the antitrust laws, where
they have not been governmentally sanctioned. And the maintenance
of a classified price plan undoubtedly can be an illegal restraint of trade.
Combinations and conspiracies to fix prices are per se violations of the
Sherman Act.0 4
Despite the apparent vulnerability of the classified price plan, and
of the cooperatives supporting it, the system has continued to flourish.
Partially accounting for this paradox are the relatively small-scale
restraints resulting, the inadequate personnel of the Department of
Justice Antitrust Division, interstate-intrastate commerce difficulties, the
fact that strong competition often remains with entry into the field
relatively easy, and a general recognition that unrestrained competition
could be particularly ruinous. 65 Moreover, a recent proceeding against
an association controlling 80% of the milk produced in the Washington,
D. C. area ended in dismissal, the Circuit Court indicating that any
restraint on trade by the classified price plan accompanied by contracts
requiring distributors .to obtain their full milk requiretnents from the
association was reasonable under the circumstances. 66
63. Receiving associations collect the milk from producers, usually in outlying parts
of large markets, provide necessary physical equipment for cooling, shipnient, etc., and
sell to the most favorable sales outlet. Bargaining associations do not actually handle
the milk, but merely procure a sales outlet for each member, who ship directly to the
purchasers. Distributing cooperatives take possession of the milk and dispose of it in
the wholesale and retail markets. Processing cooperatives convert the milk into butter,
cheese, ice cream, and other dairy products. Varying combinations of these functions in
one cooperative association are frequent. See FEzow AND ELSWORTH, AGRIcULTuRAL
COOPERATION IN THE UNITED STATEs 45-60 (F.C.A. BuLL. No. 54, 1947); HERMANN
AND W.LDEN, .op. cit. supra note 3.
64. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). But see Maryland & Virginia Milk Pro-
ducers Ass'n v. United States, 193 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1951), commented upon in note 66
infra
65. Investigation of the Milk Industry (Detroit, Michigan, Area), Dep't of Justice
Public Statement, Oct. 15, 1938; Investigation of Milk and Dairy Products Industries
(New York City), Dep't of Justice Public Statement, June 3, 1940.
66. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 193 F.2d 907 (D.C.
Cir. 1951). The actual holding of the case, a criminal prosecution, was that the necessary
intent to suppress and eliminate competition by means of full supply contracts providing
ior classification-utilization pricing had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, the court appeared to be greatly impressed by testimony that the "classified
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The major support sustaining private regulation of the local milk
sheds, however, is the promulgation of federal marketing agreements
and orders under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937.67 After proper
notice and' hearing, the Secretary of Agriculture may enter into market-
ing agreements with processors, producers, associations of producers,
and others engaged in the handling of any agricultural commodity in
interstate commerce.68 Moreover, he may issue marketing orders, either
in conjunction with or without a marketing agreement, governing the
production and distribution in interstate commerce of certain farm
commodities, including milk, tobacco, and certain fruits and vege-
tables.69 Express permission is granted for inclusion in such orders of
the classified system of milk pricing with payment of blended prices
to producers." The Secretary may select a common agency to ad-
minister the marketing order 7' and he may mediate disputes which
arise.7 2
Marketing agreements formulated under the Act are specifically
exempted from the antitrust laws, 7  as are arbitration awards."4  And,
of course, practices prescribed by the government marketing orders are
not subject to the antitrust laws."5 However, private restrictive practices
cannot be assured judicial approval merely because they could be
brought under a federal marketing order, or had previously existed
under an expired order."6 Furthermore, only the prices paid to producers
use pricing system is economically sound, [and] in practice it is responsive to compe-
tition and levels off to the same result in money as does the flat price." Id. at 916. The
court seemingly thought immaterial the fact that an artificial differentiation in the prices
charged various users was maintained so long as not shown to have been "wielded to
the disadvantage and detriment of the public." Id. at 916. This despite the well estab-
lished doctrine that price fixing is illegal per se. See cases cited in note 64 supra. For
further comrhent on the requirements contracts aspect of this case, see p. 445 infra.
67. 50 STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1946).
68. 50 STAT. 246 (1937), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 608(b) (Supp. 1951). For a de-
scription of marketing agreements -formulated under a similar statute, see NouRsE,
MARETNG AGREEMENTS UNDER THE AAA (1935).
69. 50 STAT. 246 (1937), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 608(c) (Supp. 1951). It is inter-
esting to note that the products which may come under the marketing orders include
almost all those in which monopoly control by a cooperative has been achieved or affords
much possibility of achievement. See note 60 supra and text
70. Id. § 608(c) (5). For products other than milk, the orders may limit the pro-
duction of the commodity that may be marketed during any given period. Id. § 608(c)
(6).
71. Id. §608(c) (7) (C).
72. Id. §671(a).
73. Id. §608(b).
74. Id. § 671(d).
75. United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, 307 U.S. 533, 560 (1939): "If the
Act and Order are otherwise valid, the fact that their effect would be to give coopera-
tives a monopoly of the market would not violate the Sherman Act . .. ."
76. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) ; United States v. Mary-
land & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 179 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
NOTES
may be fixed under the marketing orders. If the machinery provided
to administer the order is also utilized to fix prices charged consumers,
there may be an unlawful conspiracy.
77
The promulgation of federal marketing orders is usually instigated
by producers in the area,78 and the order must be approved by two-
thirds of the producers or.by producers of two-thirds of the volume of
the product in the area during a representative period.79 Approval by a
cooperative association is deemed to be approval by each of its members
in determining the percentage of producers favoring adoption of the
order. s0 Frequently, the order issued is modeled after a presently
existing private marketing plan developed under the egis of coopera-
tive associations operating in the market."' The combination of these
factors presents the possibility of abuse. Certain of the orders are said
to favor large producers and cooperatives which have sufficient numbers
or volume to overcome the opposition of small groups who may be
discriminatorily affected. 2 As a special advocate within the structure
of the government for farming interests, the Department of Agriculture
cannot be expected to assume an impartial attitude in determining the
fairness to all groups of its control programs. But, it should be alert
to scotch inequities in the application of controls to the individual mem-
bers of the group regulated. Further, the Department is the sole public
agency, short of Congress, with authority to determine and rectify mis-
uses of the marketing order system. As such, consideration should be
given not only to the welfare of producers as a whole, but also to the
interests of consumers and others that may be materially affected.
The Secretary of Agriculture is empowered to issue cease and de-
sist orders against cooperatives qualifying under the Capper-Volstead
Act when an association "monopolizes or restrains trade in interstate
or- foreign commerce to such an extent that the price of any agricultural
77. 85 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ohio 1949), aff'd per curiai, 188 F.2d 959 (6th Cir.
1951).
78. See HOLMAN, ACrMTIES OF THE NATIONAL MILx PRODucERs FEDERATION 4
(Educational Series No. 42, 1952). Mr. Holman, Secretary'of the Federation, attributes
the disappearance of dealer resistance to the formation of milk cooperatives to the prac-
tice of the cooperatives in applying for and securing federal marketing orders. He
also states that 44 milk marketing areas were operating under such orders at the end
of 1951, and that the tendency has been to expand the area covered by each order. Id.
at 22. The attractiveness of Federal Marketing Orders to milk cooperatives may be
lessened by the recent decision in Brannan v. Sfark, 72 S.Ct. 433 (1952). The Supreme
Court held that provisibns in the Boston area Order permitting payment to cooperatives
from the equalization pool for services rendered only to members were not warranted by
the statute.
79. 49 STAT. 753 (1935), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §608(c)(8)-(9) (Supp. 1951).
80. Id. § 608(c) (12).
81. HOLMAN, op. cit. supra note 78, at 22.
82. See Note, 17 N.Y.U.LQ. 86 (1939).
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product is unduly enhanced by reason thereof."8 3 Apparently, this power
has been rarely if ever exercised, and is co-existent with the duty of the
Attorney-General to proceed against antitrust violations by coopera-
tives.84
Certain other statutes, more specialized than the Sherman Act,
may also be applicable to cooperatives. Section 1 of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act,8 5 amending Section 2 of the Clayton Act, in general prohibits
price discrimination among different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality not justified by cost differentials where the effect may
be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.8
There appears to be no basis for treating the cooperative entity, when
acting as a buyer or seller, differently from other buyers and sellers in
the market. Furthermore, agricultural cobperatives are not included in
the specific exemptions from the Act, other than a provision that the
Act is not to prevent a cooperative association from returning to its mem-
bers net earnings in proportion to their sales to or purchases from the
association. 8 7  Therefore, marketing cooperatives are precluded from
charging such discriminatory prices, while purchasing cooperatives are
forbidden to knowingly induce or receive them, where monopoly or re-
duction of competition is threatened. 8 8
Section 3 of the Clayton Act makes unlawful leases, sales or con-
tracts for sale of commodities on the condition, agreement, or under-
standing that the purchaser or lessee will not deal in the goods of com-
petitors of the seller or lessor, where the effect may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monoply8 9 The application of
Section 3 to cooperatives may well depend upon the scope given to the
Clayton and Capper-Volstead exemptions. Certainly, contracts with
members requirirg sale of their entire production through or to the
cooperative are unaffected.9 0 However, marketing cooperative contracts
83. 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §292 (1946).
84. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 204 (1939).
85. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), as amended, 52 STAT. 446 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946).
86. See Fuchs, The Requirement of Exactness in the Justification of Price and
Service Differentials Under the Robinson-Patmt Act, 30 Tzx. L. REV. 1 (1951), for an
excellent commentary on soine Robinson-Patman Act problems. See also, Dresbach,
Cooperatives antd Some Aspects of the Robinson-Patnum Act in CooPmAvE CoaoRATE
AssoCIATIoN LAw-1950, 545 (Jensen ed. 1950).
87. 49 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1946). See Bunn, supra note 23, at 171.
88. Quality Bakers of America v. F.T.C., 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940) ; Rathke v.
Yakima Valley Grape Growers Ass'n, 30 Wash.2d 486, 192 F.2d 349 (1948). These
cases are wholly in accord with the legislative intent. See, e.g., Remarks of Representa-
tive Utterback on the Conference Report, 80 CONG. REc. 9419 (1936).
89. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1946).
90. These contracts only require the member-vendor to sell all his production to
the cooperative, they do not limit the cooperative-vendee in its dealings with competitors,
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requiring purchasers to obtain their full supply from the association are
more vulnerable.
In United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n,91
an indictment of a cooperative association, consisting of producers of
80% of the milk sold in the Washington, D. C., area, seven corporate
milk distributors, and other individuals, was sustained against a motion
to dismiss. The complaint alleged that contracts between the association'
and the' distributors provided for the classified-utilization system of
milk pricing92 and bound each distributor to purchase its full require-
ments from member producers assighed to it by the association as part
of a conspiracy to eliminate and suppress competition in restraint of
trade under Section 3 of the Sherman Act. 93 However, on appeal from
the actual trial of the case, during which the defendant disttibutors were
reduced to three handling 13.8% of the milk sales in the area, the Cir-.
cuit Court held that the full supply coniracts were not illegal in the ab-
sence of proof of a purpose to eliminate and suppress competition. 94-
The opinion, written by the dissenting judge in the first case, gave a
questionable interpretation 'to the previous decision95 and apparently was
influenced considerably by the economic usefulness of requirements con-
tracts in the milk industry.
The validity of this decision is doubtful, even as to the Sherman
Act.96 But assuming that cooperative requirements -contracts are With-
out the coverage of the Sherman Act \vhen reasonable, they may still
be proscribed by Section 3 of the Clayton Act when a substantial part
of the market is affected. The Supreme Court held such contracts to be
illegal per se in Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States,9 7
dispensing with proof of unreasonableness. 98
which would be necessary to come within the language of the Section. Moreover, such
contracts are expressly authorized by the Capper-Volstead Act.
91. 179 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
92. See note 66 supra for discussion of this aspect of the case.
93. 26 STAT.'209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1946). This Section applies the provisions
of Section 1 to restraints on trade in or with the District of Columbia.
94. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 193 F.2d 907
(1951).
95. Id. at 918 (dissenting opinion).
96. See note 66 supra. But see Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco, 125 Fed. 454 (8th
Cir. 1903); Lockhart and Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining
Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L.
REv. 913, 938 (1952).
97. 337 U.S. 293 (1949). A later case to the same effect is Richfield Oil Co. v.
United States, 72 S.Ct. 665 (1952).
98. For a general treatment of the requirement contracts question, see Lockhart and
Sacks, supra note 96 at 913; McLaren, Related Problems of "Requirements" Contracts
and Acquisitions in Vertical Integration under the Anti-Trust Laws, 45 ILL. L. REv. 141
(1950) ; Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition--The Impact of Standard Oil
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Unfair methods of competition in commerce violate Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.99 Since the section encompasses
many activities which also contravene the Sherman Act, its extension
to cooperative practice of this type should depend upon whether the
cooperative is subject to the latter statute.100 However, "corporation"
as used in the Act is defined to include associations, and there is no
obvious intent or foundation for excluding cooperatives from strictures
against misleading advertising, mislabeling, and similar deceptive
practices. 1' 1
CONCLUSION
The antitrust laws at present are not a serious obstacle to co-
operative activities. Infrequent 'prosecutions and favorable statutes and
court decisions have afforded agricultural cooperative associations broad
immunity from the state laws. The Sherman Act in conjunction with
the other federal antitrust statutes may impose a considerable restraint
on cooperatives in the future. The Borden case brings combinations and
conspiracies with independent parties under the Sherman Act, and
indicates that the exemptions of the Clayton' and Capper-Volstead Act
may be rather narrowly construed by the federal courts when the
occasion arises.
However, as yet, attempts to enforce the federal antitrust laws
against cooperatives are rare and restrictions on competition are often
accomplished under the protective shield of a -federal marketing order.
In the long run, the relationship of the antitrust statutes to cooperatives
will be determined by the attitude of Congress and the courts with re-
spect to the maintenance of competition in agriculture, and the role
allotted cooperatives in our national farm policy.
Co.,of California v. United States on the Standard of Legality Under the Clayton Act,
98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 10 (1949).
99. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1946).
100. F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 690-693 (1948), reaffirms the rule
that certain activities are encompassed by both the Sherman and Federal Trade Com-
mission Acts and contains a resum6 of the earlier cases. Under the theory of these
cases, almost any conduct violating the other antitrust statutes would also run afoul of
Section 5. "As early as 1920 the Court considered it an 'unfair method of competition'
to engage in practices 'against public policy' because of their dangerous tendency unduly
to hinder competition or create monopoly." Id. at 690, quoting from F.T.C. v. Gratz,
253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920). To the extent that these practices are "unfair competition"
because they are against the policy of the other antitrust laws, any activity which is
excluded from the coverage of those laws should no longer be considered "unfair."
101. See Chaffee, Unfair Competition. 53 HARv. L. Ray. 1289 "(1940); Notes, 42
ILL. L. Ray. 384 (1947); 26 TEx. L. Rw¢. 355 (1948).
NOTES
It is specified that the association be organized as "farmers', fruit
growers', or like associations." ' Since the doctrine of ejusden generis
is applied to this statutory phrase, it is settled that the terminology limits
the exemption to cooperative agricultural associations which either pur-
chase from or supply equipment to those engaged in producing agri-
cultural products.12
The cooperative must operate as a marketing or purchasing agency
on a cost basis, ultimately turning back all net proceeds to member and
nonmember patrons.' 3 The Bureau of Internal Revenue has construed
Non-Exempt
2. Must pay tax on such taxable income
as:
a. Non-operating or extraneous in-
come or capital gains.
b. Reserved operating earnings.
c. All operating earnings not distrib--
uted in prescribed manner.
d. All earnings distributed as interest
or dividends on capital stock.
e. All earnings done for U.S. or its
agencies, if not refunded to them.
3. Must purchase and affix excise
stamps to certain documents.
4. No Social Security preference.
5. Must maintain each year its legal and
corporate basis for excluding refunds
from gross income.
6. May pay any rate of dividends or in-
terest on capital shares (but is taxed
on amounts so paid or accrued).
7. May have unlimited capital reserves
(after income tax thereon is paid).
8. Must maintain patronage records.
9. Owned and controlled by anyone.
10. May operate in part commercially and
in part cooperatively.
11. May engage in any type of business.
12. May do business with anyone.
13. Regular two-year carry-over and
carry-back provision on losses.
Exempt
2. Does not pay such taxes.
a. No tax. [must be allocated today.]
b. No tax, but subject to limitations.
c. Must allocate operating savings to
all patrons on a patronage basis.
d. No tax, but subject to limitations.
e. May distribute to all other patrons
or (sic) patronage basis.
3. Not required.
4. Not required.
5. Must adhere to requisites for exerihp-
tion at all times during subject year.
6. Rate is limited to state rate or 8%.
7. Must limit such reserves'and allocate
them to patrons on patronage basis.
8. Must maintain patronage and alloca-
tion records. [Must file reports of
patronage today.]
9. Must be substantially controlled by
producer-patrons.
10. Must operate 100% cooperatively.
11. Must adhere to requisites for exemp-
tion.
12. Must adhere to requisites for exemp-
tion.
13. More flexible treatment for losses of
any year.
11. See note 9 supra.
12. National Outdoor Advertising Bureau v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878 (2d Ci. 1937);
Sunset Scavenger Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1936).
The Bureau of Internal Revenue has construed the term "like association" to include
a farmers' cooperative organized to operate a roadside market for its members, See
I.T. 2720, XII-2 Cum. BULL. 71 (1933).
13. See note 9 supra.
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this requirement as applicable to associations which take title to the goods
involved, as well as those functioning on an agency basis. Associations
which process the producers' -crops also are included. 14 Moreover, a
federated type cooperative may reap the benefits of the statute if it
otherwise qualifies. 15 If, however, an association is engaged in two
distinct lines of business, such as the marketing of agricultural products
for its members and the manufacture of farm machinery to be used by
its members, it must qualify with respect to each phase of its activity.' 6
Substantially all stock except non-voting, non-profit-sharing pre-
ferred stock must be owned by producers or purchaser member pa-
trons. 17  The term "substantially all" is not susceptible of precise
definition, but rather involves a question of fact which must be de-
cided in light of the circumstances of each particular case. However,
the Bureau has established a guide to aid in determining whether this
prerequisite has Veen satisfied.' 8 It has stated that an association must
explain any ownership of stock by other than actual producers, and must
show that ownership of capital stock has been restricted in so far as
possible to actual producers who market their products through the
association. If the officers of an association are required by statute
to be shareholders, the ownership of a share of stock by a nonproducer
who serves as an officer, to fulfill the statutory requirement, will not
destroy the exemption. Similarily, the exemption will not be lost if a
shareholder ceases to be a producer under. such circumstances that the
association is unable to retire or purchase this stock for some cause
beyond its control. However, if stock is voluntarily sold to nonproducers
and no extenuating explanation is forthcoming, the exemption will be
denied under the statute for the period that such stock is held. Generally,
where a cooperative association, in good faith, attempts to restrict owner-
ship of all its voting stock to producing member patrons, the privileges
accorded by the statute will not be withheld.' 9 Presumably, the same
considerations apply equally to both purchasing and marketing asso-
ciations.
The fourth requirement is that dividends may not exceed eight per
centum per annum, or the legal rate in the state of incorporation, which-
ever is greater.20 This restriction is determined on the value of the
14. MIm. 3886, X-30-5150 Cum. BULL. 164 (1931).
15. I.T. 2000, l1-1 Cum. BuLL. 290 (1924).
16. MIm. 3886, X-30-5150 Cum. BULL. 164, 167 (1931).
17. See note 9 supra.
18. MIM. 3886, X-30-5150 Cum. BULL. 164 (1931).
19. Farmers Co-operative Creamery v. Commissioner,' 21 B.T.A. 265 (1930).
20. See note 9 supra. See South Carolina Produce Ass'n v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d
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consideration for which the stock was issued,21 and applies to stock and
cash dividends, or a combination. It is not applicable to patronage
dividends since those are issued, as the term implies, on the basis of
patronage rather" than stock ownership. Nor does the limitation apply
where an association is unable to pay dividends during one year and later
makes up this arrearage, either in one year or over a period, so long as
the total paid does not exceed the prescribed amount for the entire
period.2 2 The clarity of this requirement makes its administration rela-
tively simple.
A cooperative may accumulate only those reserves required by state
law, and other reasonable reserves for necessary business purposes.2 3
Accordingly, treasury regulations permit the accumulation and main-
tenance of reasonable reserves for capital expenditures, such as the
erection of buildings and facilities required in business or for purchase
and installation of machinery and equipment.2 4 Other necessary reserves
may include provisions for depreciation charges,2 5 overpayments to
members, 26 bad debts, 27 possible loss from pending law suits, or other
specifically anticipated contingencies. 28  However, reserves may not be
accumulated, to any considerable extent, for activities which are not
necessary to the sale of members' products.2 9
Neither the cooperative nor its member patrons may realize a dis-
criminatory advantage over nonmember patrons. 30 The Bureau has
established a "guide to aid in the application of this requirement.3 ' In
742 (4th Cir. 1931), where the association was denied an exempt status because it
paid a 10% dividend.
21. In Farmers Mutual Cooperative Creamery v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 117, 125
(1935), the court said: "Admittedly, in this case $27,140 of the outstanding capital
stock of $45,680 was issued as stock dividends and the shareholders paid nothing there-
for. This fact alone bars the petitioner from claiming exemption from income tax;
for after the declaration of the stock dividends, the stockholders were receiving from
12 to 18 percent per annum on the amounts invested by them." Also see South Caro-
lina Produce Ass'n v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1931).
22. HULBERT, LEGAL PHASES OF CooPERATIVE AssocIATIONs 254 (F.C.A. BULL. No.
50, 1942).
23. See note 9 supra.
24. U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.101(12)-1.
25. 6 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 86 (1949).
26. In.San Joaquin Valley Poultry Producers' Ass'n v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d
383 (9th Cir. 1943), it was held that the cooperative did not lose its exemption by
setting up reserves for over payments to members since under California law these
amounts belonged to members rather than the cooperative.
27. WAAs & WHITE, APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX STATUTES TO
FAIRMERS' CooPERATIvEs, 104 (F.C.A. BULL. N6. 53, 1942).
28. Ibid.
29. Burr Creamery Corporation v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1932), cert.
denied, 289 U.S. 730 (1933).
30. See note 9 sup'ra.
31. Mim. 3886, X-2 CUM. BULL. 164, 166 (1931).
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short, if the association markets products for nonmember producers, the
proceeds of all business done less the ordinary deductions must be re-
turned to the patrons without distinction between members and non-
members.3 2 The cooperative may not make a profit on business transacted
with nonmember patrons and divert the proceeds from the patrons en-
titled to them. However, if the cooperative satisfies the other requirements
of the statute, but defers payment of patronage dividends to nonmembers,
the association's preferential status will not be lost if the by-laws pro-
vide for payment both to members and nonmembers and a general re-
serve is created for the distribution to nonmembers. The result is the
same where the by-laws are silent concerning payment to nonmembers,
but a specific credit to each nonmember account is 5et up on the books
of the association; or where the by-laws are silent, but it has been the
practice to make payment to nonmembers; or where patronage dividends
are payable only upon their accumulation to an extent sufficient to defray
the cost of membership.33 If the cooperative is operated in such a manner
so as to meet the requirement of the statute regarding equality of treat-
ment between member and nonmember patrons, the presence of charter
powers permitting discrimination will not cause the association to lose
the benefit of the statute.3 4  This requirement of equal treatment leads
some members to question the advantages of membership since non-
members are entitled to substantially the same rights and privileges."3
However, only members may control the organization, formulate its
internal policy, and determine with whom the association will transact
its business . 3
Finally, it is required that nonmember business must not exceed
member business and furthermore, purchasing cooperatives are limited
in their purchases for nonmember nonproducer patrons to fifteen percent
of their total -business.37 Compliance with this requirement is determined
32. I.T. 1914, 111-1 Cum. BULL. 287 (1924).
33. Ibid.
34. In regard to the general problem of discrimination between member and non-
member patrons as to distribution or allocation of earnings see Fertile Cooperative
Dairy Ass'n v. Huston, 119 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1941); Farmers Cooperative Co. of
Wahoo, Neb. v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 123 (Ct. Cl. 1938); Council Bluffs Grape
Growers Ass'n v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 152 (1941); Farmers Mutual Cooperative
Creamery v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 117 (1935) ;' Central Cooperative Oil Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 359 (1935).
In addition to the prohibition as to discrimination between members and nonmembers,
Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Company v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 64 (1938) held
that the exemption may be denied because of discrimination between actual members.
35. See WAAs & WHITr, op. cit. supra note 27, at 57.
36. In addition to the factors named the members of these organizations also
receive dividends upon the stock which they hold in the association.
37. See note 9 supra. In Producers Livestock Marketing Ass'n of Salt Lake City,
45 B.T.A. 325 (1941), it was held that where the articles of an association restrict
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by dollar ambunts of business transacted with nonmember nonproducers
and not by unit volume of product or the number of patrons in each
classification. 8 Certain types of activity on the part of a cooperative
association do not fall within the classification of nonproducer business.3 9
Such is true of any business transacted with the United States Govern-
ment or any of its agencies, for tle statute specifically eliminates such
business for purposes of establishing the right to its privileges. 40 Also,
if the cooperative'processes the goods of the member before marketing
them, it is doubtful that the purchase of ingredients to be added-to the
basic product would be considered as nonmember nonproducer business. 41
Cooperative associations have periodically advanced a series of
arguments to justify their favorable position in regard to federal tax-
ation. One such argument is predicated on an analogy drawn from the
law of agency.42 The agency theory of exemption arose under the pro-
visions of the early Revenue Acts which regarded cooperatives as sales
agents for their members. 43 At this particular time many of the asso-
ciations actually operated in such a manner. This relationship between
the association and its members, however, had inherent limitations which
made it difficult to market various types of produce for a large number
of producers and continue to function as a true agent.44 More and more
the cooperatives found it advantageous to take absolute title to the
goods, to commingle them in common storage facilities, and thus to
conduct their operations in a manner similar to other business entities
with which they were forced to compete. 45 It was no longer possible
to account individually with each member as an ordinary principal-agent
relationship requires. Moreover, the financial requirements of the typical
producer-member made it impossible for him to prolong the return of
his crop investment until his produce was eventually sold on the market.
For this reason it became expedient for the associatipn to make payment
membership to common stockholders, and the cooperative does a greater volume of
business with nonmembers than with members, the association is not entitled to the
exemption. See Cooperative Central Exchange, 27 B.T.A. 17 (1932) ; U.S. Treas. Reg.
111, § 29.101 (12)-l.
38. See W- s & WHrrE, op. cit. supra note 27, at 99.
39. I.T. 1914, 111-1 Cum. BuLL. 287 (1924).
40. See note 9 supra.
41. See HULBERT, op. cit. supra note 22, at 260.
42. See Magill and Merrill, The Taxable Income of Cooperatives, 49 MIcH. I. REv.
167, 184 (1950).
43. Revenue Act of 1924, § 231 (11), 43 STAT. 282 (1924); Revenue Act of 1921,
§231(11), 42 STAT. 253 (1921); Revenue Act of 1919, §231, 40 STAT. 1076 (1919);
Revenue Act of 1913, § IIG(a), 38 STAT. 172 (1913).
44. See PART III, pp. 421-423 supra.
45. Farmers Cooperative Co. v. Birmingham, 86 F. Supp. 201, 215 (N.D. Iowa
1949). •
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in advance and take title to the goods before marketing them, or in some
instances even prior to delivery from the producer. 46
Congress in 1926 recognized the change which had transpired and
deleted the requirement that cooperatives must operate as sales agents
to qualify under the statute.47 And in 1932 the Treasury abandoned the
agency theory by ruling that under the Revenue Acts of 1916, 1917, and
1918, cooperative organizations which did not act as agents for their
patrons, and which therefore were not exempt under the then existing
law, were nevertheless authorized to deduct patronage dividends from
gross income.48
Occasionally coopeiatives continue to maintain, despite the fact that
the Code does not presently require them to assume the position of agents,
that the statutory benefits accorded them are justified as they are merely
the agents of their members or mere conduits of the funds of their
members.49  The courts generally have denied this assertion unless the
facts of the particular case substantiate the claim after an inquiry into
the real substance of the relationship involved. One pre-1926 decision,
involving such an argument is Cooperative Central Exchange v. Com-
missioner,50 where the court recognized that cooperatives may not operate
in fact, as a true agent:
.. . [u]nless it is shown that titles to the farm products
marketed through the petitioner remained in the producers
thereof until sales were effected by it, we think the conditions
contemplated by Congress and prescribed by the statutes are not
satisfied. If the member cooperatives bought commodities from
its producing members and resold them to petitioner for further
sale to the public, it could hardly be argued that petitioner
acts as agent for the producers. In our opinion the petitioner
46. For an excellent discussion of this point see Adcock, Patronage Dividends:
Incomie Distribttion or Price Adjustment, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 505, 520 (1948).
Another fundamental characteristic of agency is lacking, as the cooperative has no right
of reimbursement or indemnity for loss resulting from transactions with a member.
Accordingly, when Southern States Cooperative sustained an investment loss of one
million dollars because of an unprofitable subsidiary, as disclosed in its annual report
for the year ending June 30, 1950, there was no doubt that this loss fell directly upon
the cooperative, not upon its members. See Hearings before Committee on Ways and
Means on Revenue Revision of 1951, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1492 (1951).
47. Revenue Act of 1926, §231 (12), 44 STAT. 40 (1926).
48. I.T. 1499, 1-2 Cum. BuLi. 189 (1932).
49. "It is often said that a cooperative, particularly a marketing cooperative, is the
agent of its producer members, and sometimes it is said that this is the reason for
this rule of exclusion. But I think that is greatly oversimplifying the matter, and hardly
a correct statement." Statement by Mr. Kitrl Loos, a representative of several well-
known cooperative associations. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on
Revenue Act of 1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2207 (1950).
50. 27 B.T.A. 17 (1932).
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has failed to prove that any of the members are producers or
producers' marketing agents within the meaning of the statu-
tory provisions 'ranting tax exemption to farmers' coop-
eratives.51
The court further discussed the factual aspects of the case, concluding
that this particular cooperative was no more an agent of its members
than any other wholesale merchant engaged in selling supplies which are
ultimately consumed by producers.
Taxable corporations have attempted to utilize the agency device
to limit their tax liability. This was the controversy in the recent case
of Railway Express Agency v. Commissioner,52 involving an attempt by
the Railway Express Co., a corporation, to limit its liability through an
express contractual agency agreement with its railroad owners. The
issue was whether or not the petitioner was taxable on the resulting in-
crease in net operating income through the disallowance of certain de-
ductions taken for depreciation. The Agency contended that it was not
liable for the additional tax as the mere agent of the owner railroads,
and contractually obligated to account to the 'owners for this amount.
After considering the true substance of the relationship, the court denied'
this contention, holding the increase taxable and stating that if a corpo-
rate device is used for business advantage there is no just ground for
protest when it results in tax liability.5 3 The decision illustrates that
courts will give credence to the agency device for reduction of tax.
liability only when it appears that a true agency relationship is present.54
The trustee theory presents an alternative basis upon which co-
operatives endeavor to vindicate their favorable tax position. 55 The
51. Id. at 20.
52. 169 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1948),'cert. denied, 336 U.S. 944 (1949).
53. Id. at 196.
54. In a recent case, National Carbide Corporation v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422
(1949), petitioners claimed a reduction in their income and excess profits taxes on the
theory that, by virtue of a contract with their controlling (Airco) corporation, they
were only agents of Airco to the extent of all their earnings in excess of expenses and
a six percent payment on their outstanding capital stock. The Court denied these
claims, holding that complete ownership of the subsidiary corporation and the control
primarily dependent upon such ownership are no longer of significance in determining
taxability. The Court also pointed out that the existence of the "agency contracts"
requiring petitioners to pay all their profits above a nominal return to Airco did not
conclusively determine that the income "belonged to Airco."
55. See Rhodes v. Little Falls Dairy Co., 245 N.Y. Supp. 432, 434 (1930), aff'd,
256 N.Y. 559, 177 N.E. 140 (1931), where the court said, "We do not agree with the
Special Term that the contract is the ordinary one of purchase and sale. Even though
title may have passed, still the arrangement is for co-operative marketing. The status
of the parties partakes of a trust or fiduciary character, and is not the simple relation
of vendor and vendee; the fund derived from the marketing of the product being
subject to distribution among the various producers, sales of whose product had gone
to make it up."
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rationale of this view is that the money received by the association from
its business transadtions is in the nature of a fund of which the manager
and directors of the association are the trustees, while the patrons are
beneficiaries. 56 The cooperative, in its capacity as trustee, is authorized
to deduct from the fund amounts for necessary expenses and return the
balance to the patrons. This theory is subject to criticism as being
unrealistic when superimposed upon the actual business procedures cur-
rently employed by most cooperatives. 57 In addition, this reference to
a trust relationship actually does not support the cooperative in justifying
its preferential tax treatment. For trusts which engage in ordinary busi-
ness activities, as distinguished from trusts which merely receive income
for distribution to the beneficiaries while exercising no managerial func:
tion, are classified as business associations and are subject to the regular
corporate tax rates. 58
The essence of a third position is that a deduction for tax purposes
of patronage refunds, the principal source of controversy over the grant
of tax advantage to cooperatives, is available not solely to cooperative
associations, but that any business entity which chooses to refund to
customers on the basis of patronage may deduct such refunds for tax
purposes. However, the practical impossibility of this choice is obvious,
since other business entities generally never find it expedient to operate
in such manner. A corporation which distributed its earnings to cus-
tomers instead of shareholders would have little reason to exist. Indeed,
the earnings of any privately owned business are of necessity distributed
to its owners. That the owners of a cooperative are at the same time
its customers renders the cooperative method of business unique but
furnishes no meaningful distinction upon which to predicate exemption.
Finally, there is advanced the price adjustment or rebate theory by
those who favor special treatment for cooperatives taxwise. 59 This propo-
sition admits that the association buys and takes title to the member
producers' product and later sells it again o'n the market. However, it
is asserted that there is no real income to the association, since the
amount returned to the patron on the basis of the business transacted
with the organization is a refund or rebate, equivalent to an adjustment
of the initial price paid the member for the product. 60 There would be
56. See California & Hawaiian Sugar Refining Corp., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 163
F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 846 (1948).
57. See PAT II, supra.
58. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); Hecht v. Malley, 265
U.S. 144 (1924).
59. For a discussion of this theory see Adcock, supra note 46.
60. See Sowards, Should Co-ops Pay Federal Income Taxes, 19 TENx. L. REv.
908, 914 (1947).
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valid basis for this argument if the cooperative actually operated in this
manner. However, such an organization usually does not refund to any
one member solely upon the basis of what he has contributed to the
enterprise. 61 It is entirely possible that a patron may furnish produce
to the association upon which it will suffer a loss due to fluctuating
market conditions. 62  Subsequently, other members may deliver produce
which are marketed at a sufficiently high price to enable the cooperative
to close the season with a net margini, making possible the payment of
a patronage refund. The member furnishing the crops which the organ-
ization marketed at a loss would, despite the loss on his products, receive
a patronage refund. In fact, if he delivered a greater volume of the
particular commodity than other producers, he would receive a pro-
portionately greater refund than the amount paid to the smaller, yet
profit producing, patron. Sums returned to a member are thus not
directly related to profits realized on the sale of his particular products
but to profits on the marketing of all the members' products. The court
in Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers' Association v. District of
Columbia63 was aware of this averaging princip!e when it stated that
the cooperative sells for its own account and not for that of the member.
That a cooperative earns income seems difficult to dispute. It has
assets and employees; it buys, sells, and performs services. The Su-
preme Court in National Carbide Corporation v. Commissioner64 recog-
61. A general analysis of the business operations of cooperatives reveals the im-
practicability if not the impossibility of relating patronage dividends to gain or loss
upon hny particular transaction with any particular patron. "To say, in effect, that a
sale remains open until the end of an accounting period to permit the payment of an
addition to the price does not recognize facts. For example, during 1946 there were
extremely wide fluctuations in the price of flaxseed, the pr"ice increasing from $3.00
to $6.00 per bushel in just a few days. Many farmers sold flaxseed to cooperative
grain elevators both before and after the price increase. In the case of a farmer who
before the price increase sold flaxseed which the cooperative sold after the price increase,
the theory that the formal sale was not closed but was in fact open pending receipt
of the additional price would require that an additional payment of almost $3.00 per
bushel be made. The farmer who had received $6.00 initially and whose flaxseed was
sold by the cooperative at $6.00 plus freight and margin would not be entitled to
receive additional payment. But cooperative corporations do not return to each farmer
the net proceeds of the sales of his produce less necessary expenses; instead, they deter-
mine the over-all net profits for flaxseed. and these profits are shared by all flaxseed
patrons in proportion to their patronage." Adcock, supra note 46, at 520-21.
62. Another example of how an individual member's transactions may result in
loss to the enterprise is in the case of a purchasing cooperative where the member only
purchases "loss leaders." Nevertheless, the member may receive a distribution based
on profits gained in another, wholly unrelated segment of the business. Moreover,
where the interval betveen members' transactions and distributions is protracted, the
"margin" distributed may be almost entirely attributable 'to inventory appreciation,
resulting from over-ill economic inflation. See Hearings before Committee of Ways
and Means on Revenue Revision of 1951, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1494 (1951).
63. 119 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
64. 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
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nized that funds derived from business enterprise are the profits of the
organization owning the assets, employing the workers, and carrying out
the commercial activities, even though a parent corporation has a legally
enforceable claim to those funds. The economic realities of such a
situation received full recognition by the Court in the Carbide case when
it called attention to the petitioner's claim that they were only taxable
on net income aggregating $1,350, despite the fact that during the
taxable year they owned assets worth twenty million dollars and earned
nearly four and one-half million-dollars net.6 5
Beyond question, Congress has the power to tax cooperative asso-
ciations, for the power of federal taxation is extremely broad. The
Supreme Court has held that the subject matter of taxation open to the
power of Congress is as comprehensive as that open to the power of the
states,66 and includes every form of tax appropriate to sovereignty.
Perhaps the leading case defining income since the Sixteenth Amendment
is Eisner v. Macomber,6 7 where the Court first expounded its philosophy
regarding the true scope of the federal taxing power. Not only may
Congress determiie what income shall be subject to tax, but has an
equally broad power to determine to whom it may be taxed.68
Congress exercised its prerogatives in the Revenue Act of 1951, where
it modified 69 the scope of the tax immunity granted to agricultural co-
operatives.T
Subparagraph (B) of IRC Section 101(12), initially abolishes the
exemption, subjecting all cooperatives to the regular corporation tax
rates.71 If, however, such an organization can qualify under the prior
65. Id. at 438.
66. Steward Machine Company v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
67. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
68. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933).
69. See note 9 supra; note 71 infra.
70. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Lederer, 252 U.S. 523 (1920), is the
only case concerning the constitutional taxability of cooperatives which has been before
the Supreme Court. The Court there held that the fact that the investment resulting
in accumulation is made by a cooperative as distinguished from a corporate concern
does not prevent the amount from properly being classified as a profit on the invest-
ment. The Court also noted that the fact that this profit was earned by a cooperative
did not afford basis for the argument that Congress did not intend to tax the ensuing
profit. In other related fields of income taxation, the Court has held that the substance
or true manner in which the taxpayer conducts his business, and not the legal form
which he might adopt determines the manner, in which he will be taxed. See Burk-
Waggoner Oil Association v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925), where the Court 'held
that Congress had the right to tax as a corporation a "Massachusetts trust" which was
technically a partnership under state law. The same principle is illustrated in the
family partnership cases, Commissioner v. Lusthaus, 327 U.S. 293 (1946); Commis-
sioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946) ; Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
71. "(B) An organization exempt from taxation under the provisions of subpara-
graph (A) [the original exemption provision under section 101 (12)] shall be subject
NOTES
requirements prescribed in subparagraph (A), it becomes 6ntitled, by
virtue of part B, to two important'deductions not available to asso-
ciations previously, termed non-exempt, i.e., those which do not meet
the seven prerequisites of 101(12) (A) .72 These constitute deductions
for dividends paid on capital stock and for amounts allocated during
the taxable year with respect to income not derived from patronage. 73
A deduction for amounts paid to patrons during the taxable year as
patronage refunds is available to all cooperatives, regardless of com-
pliance with 101(12) (A) .74 In addition to these special privileges, an
to the taxes imposed by sections 13 and 15 [the regular corporate tax rates imposed
by the Revenue Act of 1951], or section 117 (c) (1), [capital gains] except that in
computing the net income of such ad organization there shall be allowed as' deductions
from gross income (in addition to other deductions allowable under section 23)-
(i) amounts paid as dividends during the taxable year upon its capital stock, and
(ii) amounts allocated during the taxable year to patrons with respect to its income
not derived from patronage (whether or not such income was derived during such
taxable year) whether paid in cash, merchandise, capital stock, revolving funds certifi-
cates, retain certificates, certificates of indebtedness, letters of advice, or in some other
manner that discloses to each patron the dollar amount allocated to him. Allocations
made after the close of the taxable year. and on or before the fifteenth day of the
ninth month following the close of such year shall be considered as made on the last
day of such taxable year to the extent the allocations are attributable to income derived
before the close of such year.
Patronage dividends, refunds, and rebates to patrons with respect to their patronage
in the same or preceding years (whether paid in cash, merchandise, capital stock, revolv-
ing fund certificates, retain certificates, certificates of indebtedness, letters of advice,
or in some other manner that discloses to each patron the dollar amount of such divi-
dend, refunds, or rebate) shall be taken into account in computing net income in the
same manner as in the case of a cooperative organization not exempt under subpara-
graph (A). Such dividends, refunds, and rebates made after the close of the taxable
year and on or before the 15th day of the ,ninth month following the close of such
year shall be considered as made on the last day of such taxable year to the extent the
dividends, refunds, or rebates, are attributable to patronage occurring before the close
of such year."
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid. See WAAS, REcENT FEDERAL INcOmE TAX CHANGES AFFECTING COOPERA-
TivEs 2 (F.C.A. Misc. REPoRT No. 156, 1951).
74. Ibid. Senator George interpreted Section 101(12) (B) to the effect, "Patronage
allocations by cooperatives are not income to the cooperatives under this section, but
are excluded from gross income of the cooperative organization." 97 CONG. REc. 12202
(Sept. 24, 1951).
In the case of a non-exempt association, an exclusion from a cooperative's gross
income of "patronage dividends" has been permitted by Treasury Department rulings
and decisions by some lower federal courts. See Farmers Cooperative Co. v. Birming-
ham, 86 F. Supp. 201, 206 (N.D. Iowa 1949). Some writers feel that litigation under
Section 101(12) of the Code with respect to absolute exemption will be greatly de-
creased in the future, and' in turn litigation concerning the exclusion of patronage
refunds will be greatly increased. Generally speaking, for a patronage refund to be
excludable from a cooperative's gross income it must be based upon a legal obliga-
tion to pay, growing out of a pre-existing enforceable contract. See Cooperative Oil
Association v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1940), where the court impliedly
disapproved of the. practice pf the Bureau of permitting the deduction of patronage
dividends paid at the discretion of the board of directors. See also American Box,
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
organization which qualifies under the statute may take all of the de-
ductions generally available to 'any taxable corporation under Section 23
of the Code.
75
Interpretation by judicial decision or treasury regulation will be
necessary of course, to ascertain fully the impact of the 1951 amend-
ment. Under the previous statutory provisions the term capital stock,
with reference to the payment of dividends, was construed broadly to
include any type of capital, including such sources as debentures. There
is. no indication that Congress intended a different meaning; this in-
terpretation may well be carried into effect under the new provisions. A
more significant problem concerns the deductibility of dividends. If a
dividend actually has been paid to stockholders there is no difficulty.
And -even where there has been only an accrual, its deduction should
not become subject to question if the cooperative operates consistently
on the accrual method and the dividend has been declared by the board
of directors, whereby a legal obligation has been created. The principal
question regarding dividends arises in connection with the federated
cooperative organizations where dividends o.n capital stock are distributed
to member cooperative associations. If the federated cooperative has
satisfied the qualifications of Section 101 (12) (A), such dividends would
be deductible; but as to the association receiving the dividend a different
aspect of the problem is presented. Such dividends amounts channeled
to members would appear to be deductible as amounts allocated in
respect to income not derived from patronage. If they were not so allo-
cated the question arises whether they would be subject to the full
corporate tax rate, or whether the member cooperative might compute
a credit against its net margin for eighty-five percent of the dividends
received in accordance with section 26 of the Code applicable to regular
corporations. The answer is not certain, but there is substantial author-
ity that Congress did not intend the benefits of section 26 to be available
to farmers' cooperatives.7 6
Shook Export Ass'n v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. i946), where the court
denied the exclusion of patronage dividends because there was not a legally binding
contract which required their payment. In United Cooperatives, Inc. v. Commissioner,
4 T.C. 93 (1944), the court included within the petitioner's gross income that amount
of the patronage refund which might have been paid as dividends upon capital stock.
For an excellent discussion concerning the exclusion of patronage dividends from
the gross income of a cooperative see Hensel, Taxation of Cooperatives in CoopERA-
TIVE CoRPoRATE ASSOCIATION LAW (Jensen ed. 1950).
75. See WAAS, op. cit. supra note 73, at 14.
76. INT. REv. CODE §26(b). Supplemental Report No. 781, part 2, of the Senate
Finance Committee at page 30 states that where a cooperative is found subject to the
tax under section 314, it is nevertheless "to be considered exempt from income tax for
the purpose of any laws which refer to- an organization exempt from income tax.
Accordingly, such code provisions as Section 26(a) (credits for dividends received
NOTES
The deductions available under Section 23 of the Code must also
be taken into consideration, for today all cooperatives, regardless of
whether they meet the requirements of 101(12) (A), must concern
themselves with such items as reasonable reserves for depreciation and
bad debts, pension plans, and self-insurance as well as all other ques-
tions in this area facing any taxable corporation. It is now required
that all pension plans be submitted to the Commissioner for approval
before they may constitute a deductible expense. 77 In the past, taxable
corporations which have maintained self-insurance funds have found
them to be non-deductible and undoubtedly the same will apply in the
case of cooperatives. But as the new Revenue Act is not retroactive con-
cerning these associations, such an organization could change to another
plan for insurance protection if a deduction for this type of expense
were found to be desirable.
The new act imposes upon cooperatives the necessity of analyzing
each expense and reserve for which a deduction is sought to insure that
it is reasonable in amount and comparable to those allowed to other
similar taxable business entities. For if such deductions are disallowed
as unreasonable for tax purposes, the consequences may include not only
a greater tax liability; but also a complete loss of the special privileges
accorded under 101(12) (B). To take advantage of subparagraph B
of Section 101(2) of the Code, a cooperative must meet the require-
ments of subparagraph A; and one such requirement is that reserves
be reasonable. Therefore, a judicial determination that a reserve would
not be allowable as a deduction under Section 23 of the Code may also
constitute a finding that it is not a reasonable reserve within the meaning
of 101(12).
In respect to reserves for depreciation, certain cooperative associa-
tions, formerly exempt, may be faced by a dilemma stemming from past
tendencies to both under and over depreciate assets. In the case of under
depreciation, some adjustment may be required to, prevent the gaining
of a tax advantage under the new Act. The problem of past over-de-
preciation presents a somewhat more difficult question. For during the
years of over-depreciation, even though the cooperative itself was not
particularly benefited taxwise, the patrons received a tax benefit in re-
spect to their personal returns because patronage refunds were corre-
spondingly decreased. The question ,certain to arise is whether or not
such a cooperative may set its house in order and adjust the value of
from a domestic corporation which is subject to tax) and Section 141 (dealing with
consolidated returns) do not apply to cooperatives taxable under Section 101(12) (A)."
U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.101(12)-l is the applicable Treasury Regulation.
77. See Comment, 27 IND. L.J. 59 (1951).
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its assets to reflect their true worth. Even rf such an adjustment were
not permitted, there is no reason why the amounts which normally
would be charged to depreciation could not be allocated to patrons under
the provisions of the new Act and thereby place the tax burden upon
those who had formerly received the tax advantage resulting from over
depreciation.
The 1951 amendment indicates a distinct effort to narrow the tax
advantage accorded cooperatives. 7s1 Basically, however, and despite some
need for administrative clarification, there seems to be little change in
their tax liability. In substance the exemption is still available in the
form of deductions allowed upon compliance with the original seven
prerequisites for exemption; and apart from those requirements, all
cooperatives are allowed a deduction for patronage refunds. It is these
deductions, particularly those allowed for amounts allocated to patrons,
which enable cooperatives to attain their favorable tax position.
The justification for special treatment taxwise has been the peculiar
objectives which cooperatives have sought to achieve. These associa-
tions have served a vital function in the economy by constituting for
farmers an instrument of effective bargaining strength in their contact
with other private businesses. 79  Previous to the development of the
cooperative movement farmers generally were forced to purchase equip-
ment and supplies at a price set by the seller, and to sell their products
at a price set by the buyer. s0 Cooperation tends to alleviate this situation
by enabling farmers to exert their combined influence over the market,
and thus determine to some extent the prices to be received for their
commodities and those to be paid for equipment and supplies. While
this movement was in a stage of development, special protection was
needed and Congress properly granted assistance in the form of exemp-
tion from federal income taxation. The present controversy revolves
around the question of whether the continued extension of such assist-
ance is warranted.
From present statistics which are available, it is apparent that some
cooperatives have experienced vast growth since the original granting of
the exemption, and in certain instances cooperative associations have be-
78. The 1951 amendment has the effect of getting all of this income into the tax
stream at least once, whether on the part of the cooperative or in the returnof the
individual patron. Previously that amount designated as "reasonable reserves" com-
pletely escaped taxation, either to the patron or to the cooperative. This is the real
significance of the new act in regard to this particular area.
79. See PART I; pp. 373-374 supra.
80. See Hearing before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1951,
82d Cong., 1st Sess.- 1419 (1951).
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come big business. 8' The 1947-48 survey of farmers' cooperatives com-
piled by the Department of Agriculture shows that for this period these
associations had a total aggregate volume of business of $8.6 billion, of
which $7.2 billion represented farm products marketed.82  This survey
also pointed out that, while a great majority of the reporting cooperatives
were small organizations, a large percentage of the volume of business
done was accounted for by 656 large scale associations operating on a
regional or even a nation-wide basis.8  The expansion indicated by these
statistics has not been shared equally by all cooperatives, for figures avail-
able for the years 1942-43 reveal that forty-eight federated or centralized
regional cooperatives, each with a business vrolume of more than ten
million dollars, accounted for about forty-three percent of the total
volume of marketing done by cooperatives.8 4
While the causal effect of the tax exemption upon the growth of
certain cooperatives is incapable of exact determination, it would seem
that the favorable tax treatment logically has provided these associations
with some competitive advantage. The advantage is not reflected in the
price at which these organizations sell their goods, but is utilized to secure
81. In 1946 there were 6,009 cooperatives which qualified for exemption under
Section 101(1) of the Code.
Typical examples of cooperative enterprise on a large scale are: in fiscal year 1943-44
the California Cooperative Orange Growers paid $11 million for the lumber town of
Westwood and 100,000 acres of timber land, thereby acquiring a new source of wood
for paking cases for Sunkist citrus fruits. The Dairymen's League completed plans
for a $650,000 milk plant in New York City. Southern States Cooperative paid'
$300,000 for the Richmond, Virginia Trust Building. And New York's G.L.F. gave
Cornell University $200,000 for its school of nutrition. See Big Business Without
Profit, 32 FORTUNE 152 (1945).
82. Farmers' marketing and purchasing associations: Estimated number of associa-
tions and business done for specified periods, 1913 to 1947-48.
(Mofiey figures in millions)
Number of
Periods associations Marketing Purchasing Total
1913 ------------------------ 3,099 $ 304.4 $ 5.9 $ 310.3,
1921 ------------------------ 7,374 1,198.5 57.7 1,256.2
1925-26 --------------------- 10,803 2,265.0 135.0 2,400.0
1930-31 --------------------- 11,950 2,185.0 215.0 2,400.0
1935-36 ------------------- 10,500 1,586.0 254.0 1,840.0
1940-41 --------------------- 10,600 1,911.0 369.0 2,280.0
1945-46 ------------------- 10,150 5,147.0 923.0 6,070.0
1947-48 ------------------- 10,135 7,195.0 1,440.0 8,635.0
1948-49 ------------... ---- 10,075 7,297.6 2,022.4 9,320.0
Source: STATISTICS OF FARMERS' MARKETING AND PURCHASING CooPERATIVES, 1947-
48. Farm Credit Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1950.
83. TAx TREATMENT OF COOPERATIVES, PART 2, p. 3, by Staffs of the Treasury and
the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation (Apr. 1951).
84. Ibid.
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a large source of reserve capital, permitting their very rapid expansion. 5
It is interesting to note that the gross income of farmers' cooperative
associations in 1945 was $5.65 billion and for 1949 it was $9.3 billion.8 6
Thus, in four years the percentage increase has been 65 percent or an
average of approximately 16 percent per year. While in theory the
savings or net margins of cooperatives are returned to their members
in the form of patronage dividends, such has not always been the case.
From the information available for 1946, it appears that exempt co-
operatives with gross receipts of $50,000 or more had aggregate net
margins, before patronage dividends or other distributions to members,
of $140 million. The breakdown of this amount shows $28 million
specifically set aside for reserves, six million dollars paid as dividends
oNn capital stock, and $106 million paid as patronage dividends. In
respect to this latter amount, however, approximately $16.5 million only
was paid in cash, with the remainder credited to members as patronage
dividends but not actually distributed.8 7 Therefore, of the aggregate
net margins of $140 million, approximately $118 million was retained
for working capital, capital expenditures, and reserves. And under
present internal reserve provisions, the entire amount would be allowed
as a deduction for tax purposes.
Clearly, the question of whether the special treatment accorded co-
operatives taxwise can be presently justified must continue to be
answered with reference to the function which cooperatives perform.
Their legitimate objective, to constitute an instrument of economic and
85. The advantages which the exemption permits may best be illustrated by a specific
example. 'First, it must be remembered that an exempt cooperative pa~s no federal
income tax. Consumers Cooperative Association of Kansas City, Missouri, does not fall
within the, exempt status but has the privilege of deducting patronage dividends from
their net margins for tax purposes. This organization in 1948 paid federal income taxes
of p400,000 on an aggregate of total business transacted of $55,000,000, and if they had
paid on the same basis as competing corporations, they would have been obligated
to pay approximately $2,000,000. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on
Revenue Revision of 1951, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1260 (1951). Their patronage dividends
paid in cash for the same year were $62,134 out of a total net savings of $8,019,160.
See, 1948 AND 1949 HANDBOOK ON MAJOR REGIONAL FARM SUPPLY PURCHASING CO-
OPERATIVES 10 (F.C.A. Misc. REP. 1950). Converting these figures to percentages, it
appears that this cooperative earned 14.5 percent on total sales and 61.5 percent on total
patrons equity which would be the equivalent of invested capital in an ordinary corpo-
ration.
The same cooperative built a 3,400-barrel oil refinery at Phillipsburg, Kansas, several
years ago. Out of its tax free earnings it was able to pay for the entire plant in about
two years, although an average taxpaying company, building the same refinery, might
well have required from ten to fifteen years to this capital expenditure. Sowards, note
23 supra, at 921.
86. The general inflationary trend which occurred during this period must be con-
sidered.
87. See TAx TREATMENT OF COOPERATIVES, op. cit. supra note 8, at 4.
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socio-psychological benefit to farmers, cannot reasonably be questioned.
The crux, then, is whether tax privileges are necessary to continued
achievement of this goal. Cast inevitably into this mold, the inquiry is
solely a matter for legislative policy judgment,88 aided in part by an
analysis of the present relative efficiency, capital requirements, and
economic strength of cooperatives.
The issue should not be confused by pleas for symmetry in the "tax
laws, nor by indignant reference to inequality of treatment. Neither is
it relevant to engage in the fiction of classifying the cooperative as an
agent, or a trustee, or to assert that it is a mere conduit of funds with no
income of its own. Such arguments are meaningless in themselves, and
they further have the effect of speciously concealing the only valid ap-
proach to a solution of the cooperative tax problem. 9
A provision of the new internal revenue act requires cooperatives to
submit detailed and comprehensive reports concerning certain aspects
of their financial affairs. 90 In accordance with the notion that their
88. See Packel, Cooperative and the Income Tax, 90 U. oF PA. L. REV. 137 (1941).
89. The confusion in the entire field can best be illustrated by the manner in which
the cases and writers attempt to deal with some of the problems. Where under the
applicable state statutes a cooperative is authorized to act both as agent and purchaser,
the parties may expressly adopt by agreement and practice the seller-purchaser rela-
tionship in order to secure economic advantages. See Clinton Co-op. Farmers Elevator
Ass'n v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 223 Minn. 253, 26 N.W.2d 117 (1947).
Writers have also argued that the cooperating members are the real parties in interest
in any transaction undertaken by the association; that the cooperative is a legal entity
and takes legal title to goods in order to adapt itself to the usages of trade and that
this legal title preserves the rights of members and exists only for a special and limited
purpose, i.e., for the benefit of those who deal with the association in good faith and in
the normal course of business. Henderson, Cooperative Marketing Associations, 23 COL.
L. REV. 91 (1923) ; Note, 23 NoTRE DAME LAW 342 (1948). Also see O'Meara, The
Federal Income Tax in Relation to Consumer Cooperatives, 26 ILL. L REv. 60 (1941).
90. Section 314 further provides: "Such dividends, refunds, and rebates made after
the close of the taxable year and on or before the 15th day of the ninth month fol-
lowing the close of such year shall be considered as made on the last day of such taxable
year to the extent the dividends, refunds, or rebates, are attributable to patronage
occurring before the close of such year." See note 71 supra. In view of the statutory'
language three connotations of this section are possible. First, since no other reporting
date has been prescribed, it may be assumed that all such organizations will operate on
a calendar year reporting on March fifteenth in accordance with Section 53 of the Code,
with the privilege of amendment concerning patronage dividends attributable to patron-
age during the taxable year until the fifteenth day of the ninth month. The second
possible interpretation is in view of the language "such taxable year" in the statutory
provisions that such an organization may operate either on a calendar or fiscal year
and follow the procedures outlined above. Third, this section may also be construed
in effect that the reporting date shall be the fifteenth day of the ninth month for all
cooperative associations qualifying under the section. This interpretation would provide
the greatest ease of administration; however, the ambiguousness of the language will
permit the Commissioner to use discretion in selecting the method which presents the
greatest ease of administration for both the Bureau and the organizations falling under
the section.
In regard to this problem Senator George has said: "... the bill as it was pre-
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tax position presents a legislative problem only, it is suggested that the
ready availability of data taken from" this source might aid a con-
gressional re-evaluation of the government's taxing policy toward co-
operatives.
pared by the Senate Finance Committee gave to the cooperatives until the 15th day of
the third month after the close of their fiscal year to make their distribution or rebates
of allocation of earnings. I submit 'that the time is too short within which farm coop-
eratives can have audits made of their books and notify their large number of share-
holders and patrons.. . . I am proposing to strike the word 'third' and inset the word
'ninth', so that the cooperatives would have until the middle of the ninth month after
their fiscal year began to complete their audits, make their distributions and alloca-
tions, and notify their members." .97 CONG. REc. 12202 (Sept. 24, 1951).
For the calendar year 1951 the returns on Forms 1096 and 1099 must include patron-
age dividends, rebates and refunds totaling $100.00 or more during the calendar year.
A separate Form 1099 must-be prepared for each patron to whom an allocation of
$100.00 or more has been made during the calendar year.
